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ABSTRACT
While citizenship scholars have documented the increasing mor-
alisation of immigration and integration policies, relatively few
have explored how immigrants themselves make sense of their
(partial) membership of European welfare states. Drawing on semi-
structured interviews and participant observation with Syrian refu-
gees, this article documents how they interpret and act upon the
partial and limited citizenship status they are given in Belgium. We
focus on one dimension of their experiences: their stigmatic
dependency upon the Belgian welfare state. While their accounts
can be partly understood as reproducing neoliberal discourses, we
argue that they are also a strategic reaction against the depen-
dency that is inadvertently created by European welfare states.
From our respondents’ perspectives, their social rights thus appear
not so much as entitlements to be claimed, but as a continuation
of the humanitarian logic of the (unreciprocated) gift.
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Introduction
Over the past fifteen years, European welfare states have increasingly moralised the
conditions to acquire citizenship (Fassin and Mazouz 2007; Geddes & Scholten
2016; Joppke 2007; Monforte et al 2018; Schinkel and van Houdt 2010). Tests have
been put in place to assess immigrants’ knowledge of local customs, their language
proficiency, achievements on the labour market and their affective and existential
affiliation to the host society (de Wilde 2015; Raco 2009; Van Puymbroeck,
Blondeel, and Vandevoordt 2014). Their rights to residence, work, education and
a wider range of welfare arrangements partly depend upon their compliance with
these tests, immigrants are expected to ‘earn’ their citizenship by behaving and
feeling in morally proper ways. In this sense many immigrants are semizens, with
their status pending between inclusion as citizens (e.g. native-born nationals), and
exclusion as denizens (e.g. undocumented migrants). This development has been
commonly understood as a neoliberal citizenship regime imposing two sets of
demands on immigrants: cultural assimilation (accepting and adopting the alleged
norms and values of the host society) and economic self-reliance (producing their
own income rather than receiving social benefits).
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But how do immigrants themselves make sense of their status as semizens? Most
citizenship scholars have concentrated on either the state and its policies (Joppke 2007;
Schinkel 2010; Schinkel and van Houdt 2010), or on the more activist immigrants that
assert their claims to citizenship (Isin and Nielsen 2008; Nyers and Rygiel 2012). The
few studies that have explored the perspectives of more ‘ordinary’ semizens in the
particular context of European states,1 seem to suggest that they adopt and reproduce
the latter’s neoliberal discourses. Monique Kremer (2016), for instance, documented
how a significant portion of immigrants in the Netherlands, prefer to ‘earn’ their social
rights over time, rather than receive them immediately as an unconditional right.
Similarly, Pierre Monforte and his colleagues (2018) have demonstrated how immi-
grants awaiting the UK ‘citizenship test’ reproduce distinctions between ‘deserving’ and
‘undeserving’ Others. The dominant interpretation, is that immigrants thereby disci-
pline themselves through ‘techniques of the self’ (Foucault 2009) into a discourse of
deservingness.
In this article we want to contribute to this line of research by complicating it.
Drawing on in-depth interviews with Syrian refugees in Belgium, we argue that
immigrants’ perspectives should not be reduced too easily to mere reproductions of
a neoliberal, state-centred discourse. There is an underlying risk in critical interpreta-
tions such as these to conceive immigrants’ ‘bottom-up’ perspectives as a contemporary
form of ‘false consciousness’ that primarily serves to discipline them into obedience.
While we do not contend the pervasive power of these neoliberal discourses, we think it
is crucial to take immigrants’ perspectives more seriously. From their point of view, the
battle they are fighting is one of regaining their independence from the state, and
restoring their dignity as capable social agents. To them, the social rights provided by
the state appear as a ‘gift’ that cannot be reciprocated. Adopting this people-centred
perspective does not mean that we need to relinquish a critical stance towards the state
and its policies. It simply means that we need to turn our attention to different aspects
of how it regulates its relation with immigrants. European citizenship regimes, that is,
do not only provide ever more limited and conditional rights to immigrants: they also,
inadvertently, put immigrants into a position of dependency as their practical access to
work, housing and social networks remains hampered.
Citizenship as a gift, or: the persistence of humanitarian reason
In studies of humanitarianism, aid is often perceived as a gift that cannot be recipro-
cated. Doctors, nutritionists and camp managers control the material and legal
resources refugees are lacking: they allocate shelter, distribute medicine and food, and
can move freely between places. Especially in camps, refugees’ dependence on aid
providers is further intensified by the fact that they usually have limited access to
work, education or health care. As a result, refugees are put in a position from where it
is difficult to reciprocate the ‘gift’ of humanitarian aid by, for instance, contributing to
the camp or host society economically, socially or culturally (Fassin 2012; Harrell-Bond
1986, 1999, 2002; Indra 1993; Rozakou 2012, 2016). Instead, they are expected to behave
as needy, grateful and obedient victims, rather than agents taking control over their
own lives (Agier 2011; Cabot 2013; Malkki 1996; Moulin 2012). In this sense, the
relations between providers and recipients of aid have something in common with
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those between European welfare states and their immigrants: the more powerful actor
imposes a series of more or less implicit moral expectations on the less powerful one.
Thus aid recipients and immigrants are expected to behave in ‘proper’ ways, as a result
of their position of dependency.
In spite of this shared moral economy, the logics of humanitarianism and neoliber-
alism diverge on two crucial points. First, humanitarian settings tend to stimulate and
prolong dependency, whereas neoliberal citizenship regimes attempt to increase eco-
nomic self-sufficiency. While refugees of course never lose their capacity to act as
resourceful agents (Sigona 2015), most humanitarian environments have the effect of
discouraging them to take control over their own lives. Recipients are expected to
behave as ‘speechless emissionaries’ of their suffering, rather than capable social agents.
Champions of neoliberal policies, by contrast, attempt to reduce individuals’ depen-
dency on the state and its social benefits through a range of measures rewarding and
sanctioning their success on the labour market. Second, humanitarianism tends to feed
into segregation, whilst neoliberal citizenship regimes try to enforce cultural assimila-
tion. Humanitarian interventions such as refugee camps are more often than not
designed to ‘contain’ displaced persons, separating them spatially, socially and legally
from the host society as long and as effectively as possible (Agier 2011; McConnachie
2016). European welfare states, by contrast, try to assimilate immigrants into an
imaginary nation through a shared set of norms and values (Schinkel 2010; Schinkel
and van Houdt 2010). In short while humanitarianism has the tendency to produce
dependency and segregation, neoliberalism focuses on generating champions of self-
sufficiency and assimilation.
In the few studies that examined immigrants perspectives on their citizenship status,
scholars have mainly emphasised how immigrants’ discourses of deservingness and ‘earn-
ing’ citizenship seem to reproduce neoliberal discourses of self-sufficiency, assimilation and
obedience (Fassin and Mazouz 2007; Kremer 2016; Monforte et al 2018). In this article, we
both provide further evidence for this claim, whilst complicating it. Taking immigrants’
own accounts seriously, we argue that they cannot be reduced to a slavish reproduction of
neoliberal discourses. From their perspective, citizenship appears primarily as
a continuation of the humanitarian logic of the (unreciprocated) gift. Their social rights,
defined here as the access to welfare arrangements such as social benefits, health care, child
care, social housing and general well-being services (Morris 2010; Nash 2009), are experi-
enced as stigmatic forms of support that turn them into unworthy subjects depending on
the state. Although the discourses and strategies our respondents use fit within neoliberal
discourses, they also indicate that their struggle for agency and independence is rooted in
their own expectations of personal reciprocity and informal solidarity, and in the culturally
specific repertoires of hospitality and dignity they have at their disposal.
First, our respondents frequently underlined their difficulties with the formalistic
nature of social citizenship in Belgium. By applying for asylum in Belgium, Syrian refugees
entered a welfare state where most forms of solidarity and help are regulated through
a series of fixed criteria and rights, decided upon by politicians and administrators, and
executed by a wide range of professional institutions and street-level bureaucrats. Asylum
seekers are thus entitled to accommodation in a collective centre or social housing and to
professional socio-juridical assistance, whilst recognised refugees are entitled to social
benefits, language education and, in most cases, job training and education. This type of
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indirect, impersonal solidarity is characteristic for most West-European welfare states and
the social rights they produce (Albertini and Semprebon 2018; Stjernø 2009). Yet, our
respondents frequently emphasised they preferred to rely on informal social networks,
both by comparing reliance on the welfare state metaphorically to kinship-based solidarity,
and by actively seeking out informal social support as a practical strategy to address their
needs, even when they had formal social rights at their disposal. This was particularly
evident in their accounts of interactions with social workers – where they expected social
assistants to act as friends or friends of friends – and, to a lesser degree, in their accounts of
receiving social benefits.
Second, and perhaps more structurally, there is a crucial difference between neolib-
eral discourses and the practical regulations between the political community and its
semizens. In its discourse, European states increasingly emphasise that immigrants need
to provide their own income and assimilate to local customs and habits. In practice,
immigrants’ access to work, education, housing and social life is obstructed by a wider
range of implicit barriers (Morris 2010). If that is the case, the social rights immigrants
are given, can appear as a gift that cannot be reciprocated. Hence their discourses
emphasising their work ethos and denouncing dependency upon the state are not
necessarily or exclusively a product of neoliberal discourse, they are also created by
how citizenship regimes practically function.
Through the eyes of our respondents, then, citizenship appears as a continuation of the
humanitarian logic of the (unreciprocated) gift. From their perspective, this conception of
citizenship serves two purposes. On the one hand, it serves as a discursive strategy to
portray themselves as honourable, well-intending individuals, rather than passive victims.
And on the other, it serves as a practical strategy to take back agency over their own lives,
out of the hands of the hosting and disciplining state. In the remainder of this article, we
first describe our data and methods, before substantiating our argument by describing
Syrians’ discourses on social benefits and professional social assistance, and by subse-
quently detailing their strategies to undo their dependency upon them.
Data and methods
This article draws upon 26 interviews with 39 respondents who had applied for asylum
in Belgium after the summer of 2011. All interviews were conducted between
February 2015 and March 2016 by the main author. Respondents were recruited
through a variety of channels, and were selected so as to maximize variation in terms
of legal position, socioeconomic background, ethnic-religious affiliation and, to a lesser
extent, gender.2 These interviews were as open as possible: people joined and left
throughout the conversations (hence the difference between the number of interviews
and the number of respondents), and the main author maintained regular informal
contacts with about a dozen of the respondents.
The encounters took place where and when it suited the respondents best, which
ranged from the interviewer’s home to that of the respondents, reception centres, public
coffee and tea houses, parks, university buildings and the offices of civil organizations.
After a brief introduction, conversations began with a general sketch of the research, after
which respondents were simply asked how things were going at that particular point in
time. About one-third of the respondents then immediately engaged in quite elaborate
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talks and discussions, on whatever topic came up, as well as on issues the interviewer
brought up because they had emerged in earlier talks with other respondents.
Respondents who did not spontaneously engage in elaborate discourses were asked
to discuss a limited part of their ‘life histories’, from leaving their homes in Syria up
until the here and now (Ghorashi 2008; Hamblin and Al-Sarraf 2010). The issue of
welfare dependency resurfaced in the interviews even though the questions were not
framed using moral terms such as dignity, worthiness or justice. Instead, respondents
were asked how they experienced their residence in Belgium at different points in time,
and from which persons or institutions they received support.
The interviews were analysed inductively, with key issues being coded openly on the level
of individual sentences. These sentences were subsequently re-arranged according to the
different codes, two of which comprised quotes and anecdotes on receiving social benefits
and finding work, and their experiences with professional social assistance. This article builds
in particular on the analysis of the quotes and anecdotes emerging under these two codes.3
Lastly, we want to explain why we have chosen to discuss the two particular social rights
of social benefits and professional assistance. There are three reasons for this. First, in
contrast with other social rights such as unemployment benefits, pensions or social housing,
they are among the few rights that refugees effectively can take up. The Belgian welfare state
is a combination of a mainly contributory system of work-based social insurance (which
provides ‘unemployment benefits’) and a non-contributory system of social benefits (or
a ‘living allowance’). To be entitled to unemployment benefits one has to fulfil the general
conditions of eligibility such as waiting periods and minimal contributions, which basically
means that refugees can only become eligible through sustained periods of work (Mussche,
Corluy, and Marx 2013). Arguably the most important social right for recognised refugees
are hence social benefits (or a ‘living allowance’), which are not work related, and provides
them with a minimum wage in a period in which they are unlikely to find a job.
Second, refugees’ access to social rights is mediated through formal encounters with
professional assistants, most of whom are social workers employed by either local, regional
or national government agencies or an NGO. From this perspective, it makes sense to
study Syrian refugees’ experiences of their social rights by focusing on social benefits and
their encounters with professional assistants. Third, these two welfare arrangements were
among the most frequent topics to emerge from the interviews. As stated above, these
interviews did not explicitly focus on receiving benefits or interactions with social workers,
but on Syrians’ overall experiences of their lives in Belgium. Most of our respondents
expressed their frustrations with being unable to find work. Instead of gaining indepen-
dence, they felt they were being disciplined into dependency, by taking up social benefits
and by obediently following the instructions of professional social assistants.
Social rights as gifts
Social benefits
Like most Belgian citizens, recognised refugees are entitled to a number of social
benefits funded by the Federal government. One of these, the so-called living allowance
(‘leefloon’) consists of 833 euros per month per single person, although this amount is
higher if the recipient is the main carer for his or her children, and decreases if (s)he is
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living together with individuals also receiving benefits, or receiving other types of
income. The local social services distributing the allowance repeatedly check whether
recipients are effectively entitled to them. If they have other, unreported sources of
income, do not search for employment, refuse job openings or fail to learn Dutch, their
benefits can be suspended. As in other West-European countries, the general political
climate has become increasingly restrictive, with many politicians pleading for
a tougher stance on welfare and immigration (Verhoeven and Tonkens 2013;
Jorgensen et al 2016; Van Puymbroeck, Blondeel, and Vandevoordt 2014). For
a considerable number of Syrian refugees, receiving such benefits was experienced as
a demeaning, stigmatising experience (Goffman 1973; Rogers-Dillon 1995). In one of
our very first interviews, Ahmad, a young Syrian man who interrupted his university
education, expressed his experiences of receiving these benefits in the first few months
after being granted refugee status:
Ahmad: That time I was really feeling a loser. I felt like I didn’t have any future.
Like I cannot stand up again and build a new future, ever. That that was
in my mind. I came to Europe, okay, it ends here, you will take your
help, your, money 800 euro from OCMW (The municipal centre for
social well-being that provides social benefits), or whatever, and pay your
rent, and you sleep and you eat. And that’s it, that’s the end. Here you
will die. And you kill me and you are really killing me if you give me
money without nothing. (pause) Yeah, that means an income without
heart, without work.
Interviewer: Without putting your soul into it.
Ahmad: Yes, you don’t earn that money because it’s not coming from heaven. It’s
money for someone else, and that really shocked me.
According to Khaled, a thirty-four-year-old man who used to own his own small
shop, being dependent on social benefits makes some of his compatriots feel de-
humanised:
Most of the Syrian people here, they are not happy because they are taking money from
OCMW. A lot of people they thought that it’s easy to find work, to be independent, to have
some money, to do some work. And now (pause). Sometimes, the people (pause). I was
told by my friend: I feel like an animal, going to school, just sitting all the day. I should be
working (quoted in Vandevoordt and Verschraegen forthcoming).
It would be too easy, we think, to dismiss accounts such as these as slavish reproduc-
tions of a neoliberal discourse as deservingness. Instead, they seem to express a growing
frustration with a different aspects of the Belgian citizenship regime: its dependency-
creating effects due to more structural barriers to the labour market, and an indirectly
enforced reliance upon social benefits. If state-organised solidarity is perceived as a ‘gift’,
rather than a ‘right’ that emancipates its rightful owner, then the latter can hardly escape
feeling in an inferior position. As Marcel Mauss ([1950] 2002, 15) noted a long time ago:
What imposes obligation in the present received and exchanged, is the fact that the thing
received is not inactive. Even when it has been abandoned by the giver, it still possesses
something of him. Through it the giver has a hold over the beneficiary just as, being its
owner, through it he has a hold over the thief.
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The most logical response to such a condition would be to reciprocate this gift as
soon as possible, to relieve the receiver of both his debt and his morally inferior
position (cf. Bourdieu [1972] 1977). This was however improbable if not impossible
for most respondents in the first few months after being granted protection, as they
faced several structural barriers in finding work. While professional degradation affects
many refugees in the North (Morris 2010), in Belgium access to the labour market
seems particularly difficult, as it has one of the lowest employment rates of immigrants
in Europe (OECD/EU 2015; Rea et al. 2014). The inability to reciprocate these social
benefits as ‘gifts’ therefore nullified respondents’ dignity as moral selves. As Ahmad, the
young man who interrupted his university education, emphasised:
You need to build something for yourself you know. You can have kids and have a family
but if you are living on the backs of others, you are nothing. Don’t hang on the backs of
the people, otherwise you will never stand up on your legs, never.
Some respondents contrasted their dependency on social benefits with the more
personal reliance on their parents – or more precisely their fathers – which they
considered more ‘natural’ and more easily extended in time. Ali, a single man who
also had to interrupt his university education, told us:
Belgium is not your father, to give you money. Really it’s like this. . . So I’m waiting for
a positive decision (on my application for asylum). After I receive a positive decision,
I won’t sit on the government. Belgium is not my father. Belgium, accepted me and
protected me, so I have to work here, I have to, start my life here. Maybe I will study
for myself, but in another way, I don’t study on the government. The government don’t
pay me for studying, because Belgian people paying for study. So, if you don’t have a father
here, if someone, a Belgian’s father and mother were dead, so he has to, work to study. So
why would you come here and make the government pay for your university and for
everything you want. Maybe it’s because you are cheap, it’s because you are cheap (partly
quoted in Vandevoordt and Verschraegen forthcoming).
The anger Ali expressed towards those making illegitimate use of social benefits, can
be understood, on the one hand, as a speech act legitimising his own position as
a refugee, simultaneously distinguishing his identity from illegitimate others
(Vandevoordt and Verschraegen forthcoming; Fassin and Mazouz 2007; Kremer
2016; Monforte et al 2018; Nawyn 2011). To present themselves as ‘deserving’ subjects
who want to work hard rather than take benefits, they strategically distinguish them-
selves from others. On the other hand, the fact that some respondents4 used the analogy
of the unconditional dependency upon one’s family – particularly upon one’s father –
seems to indicate that they use a cultural repertoire emphasising the preference of
relying on family ties rather than the state for social support. This discursive strategy
seems to be corroborated by their strategies to become independent from the Belgian
state as quickly as possible – which we will discuss later in this article .
Ahmad, for instance, told us how he had relied strongly upon distant relatives
who had arrived in Belgium before him, which had enabled him to become inde-
pendent from welfare benefits quicker than most of the refugees he had befriended
since his arrival. Like many respondents, he equated self-reliance with his informal
social capital:
CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 7
You need to take care of yourself. Don’t rely on others. But don’t look at me, I am strong
one, hey! I know a lot of others.
In other cases, these (self-legitimating) boundaries were drawn on a collective level,
such as that of Syrian nationality. In that case, the message was simple: others may
abuse the system, but Syrians do not. As we have detailed elsewhere, this does seem to
feed into neoliberal discourses of deservingness, distinguish more legitimate social
groups from others (Vandevoordt and Verschraegen forthcoming). Hassan, a thirty-
two-year-old father who used to work as an accountant, told us at length about
households that try to increase their living allowance by pretending to be factually
divorced, while in reality they are still living together. It made him sad, he said, though
he was quick to emphasise that:
“Syrian people, they don’t do it, because they are new here. They don’t know these things.
But it’s some people from Iraq or other people, I don’t know but I see it, I hear about it,
and I feel sad about it. It’s like stealing. . .. It’s not you right to take money from other
people. They need it too.”
Socio-legal assistance
In Belgium, asylum seekers and recognised refugees are entitled to professional socio-
legal assistance from street-level-bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980), most of whom are social
workers. Some are direct representatives of the municipality or the Federal state, others
are employed by social organisations. As we noted before, asylum seekers and refugees’
access to social rights is usually mediated by such social workers. Crucially, more than
half the respondents expressed at least one negative experience with these street-level-
bureaucrats. What seemed to frustrate them especially were the bureaucratic, imperso-
nal treatments they received (cf. Herzfeld 1992). Soraya, a thirty-three-year-old woman
who used to work as a teacher, recalled the difference between her teacher at school and
the assistant and the municipal social services:
Like the teacher in the school, if they saw me like, a bit tired or something like that, the
teacher asked me directly what’s up, are you tired? Like, she showed me that she cared
about me, she was respecting and so on. So I really liked this teacher. (..) But, with the
assistant, really, there was no respect at all.
As their questions were not answered and their grievances not taken seriously,
Syrians often felt unable to talk among equals, something they experienced as an
insult to their moral selves. Frustrations centred particularly around the hierarchy
implied in any client-assistant relationship (Herzfeld 1992; Lipsky 1980). Instead of an
impersonal, professionally distant treatment, Syrians expected to be treated as equals
vis-à-vis the professionals helping them. Hanya, a twenty-seven year-old woman who
used to be housewife, told us about the assistants in the accommodation centre she
was staying in:
They talk too much but they don’t listen. The management in the camp is not good. They
stay in their building, and they say, here it’s normal, your life is normal, why do you ask so
much. If we want to see the manager, it’s like going to the government in Syria. It’s very
bad, they don’t erm (pause).
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Interviewer: they don’t listen you mean?
Hanya: Yeah they’re just busy go go. And they always, we tried to talk to the
manager to open a different building for the children and the families.
That building was empty. And they said no. But they are just working
here, the manager, she has heating in her building, and she don’t have to
wear these clothes for three weeks. It’s just where she works, she goes
home. And they tell us that it’s normal here, but it’s not normal. It’s cold.
If we have to go to the toilet, we have to go outside, in the rain,
800 metre, even with children. And at night there’s always noise, we
can’t sleep.
Yasmine, a thirty-two-year-old single woman who used to work in the small shop
owned by her father-in-law, also assumed equality vis-à-vis her assistants when she
talked about her experiences in an accommodation centre:
So I told him (the assistant) just sit, like friends, on the floor okay, and talk together, and
just have, this once, every time with every person, and I am here, if you need me for
translate, and he said okay thank you, for telling me this, but he did not do it.
When social assistants were appreciated, however, this also usually had a lot to do
with interactional forms and courtesy. To some asylum seekers who had only just
arrived in Belgium, this seemed even more important than assistants’ ability to effec-
tively help them with their problems and queries (e.g. housing, legal advice, access to
medical care, etc). In other words, when assistants moved away from their professional
role by acting more informally, they were appreciated most by our respondents. As
Abdul, a thirty-four-year-old father of three who used to work as a manual labourer in
a factory, told us: ‘the assistant treated me and my family really good. Even when we
left, four days ago, some of the assistants, they were almost crying because we left. They
were respectful, they had smiling faces, all the time.’
Two brothers who used to work as farmers, and who were now dispersed over
different municipalities in Belgium, compared their assistants:
Interviewer: And how is the relation with assistants?
Translator: they say that it’s a cold relationship.
Respondent: Europi! (laughs)
Translator: They’re not too enthusiastic about their work
you know, this is for you, this is for me, okay,
go, that’s it.
T (translating for another respondent): here, they say the assistant came to the house
and visited them. Yeah, it was very good, she
asked how are you, what do you want, if you
need to something to be fixed let me know.
These examples show that many Syrians feel their social subjectivities are misrecog-
nised or suspended by receiving formalised help. The welfare state’s formal solidarity
appears as an ‘equaliser’ erasing nearly all individual qualities and group identities:
irrespective of who you are, what your moral qualities are, you are taken to be the same
as others when receiving help from the welfare state. Their capacities as individuals, and
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characteristics as group members of families, ethno-national or religious groups sud-
denly became irrelevant. Even though receiving benefits and professional help are, of
course, more widely experienced as a stigma (Rogers-Dillon 1995), it seems plausible
that these stigmatic experiences are intensified when individuals perceive the welfare
state through the perspective of personal reciprocity. Many of our Syrian respondents
indeed had high hopes for a more personal kind of solidarity – in line with the
unwritten rationale that any help given now, will be returned to the giver in the long
run (Mauss [1950] 2002). The support they received from professional, salaried social
assistants, however, emerged as hard if not impossible to reciprocate, leaving them with
the stigma of depending on an organisation, rather network of friends and family.
Strategic responses to stigmatic experiences
Strategic responses to welfare dependency
In line with our argument that welfare dependency creates an asymmetrical power
relation between giver and receiver, some of our respondents’ actions and reactions can
be understood as strategies to subvert or change this power-less, dominated position.
Most strikingly, their perspectives on receiving social benefits fed into an ‘aspirational’
ethic (Raco 2009) commanding them to find work as soon as possible. In their first few
months after arrival in Belgium, most Syrians wanted to accept any job they could
possibly exert, regardless of the socio-professional status, income, or career opportu-
nities it would give them. The main imperative was to become independent from the
benefits they felt they did not deserve – an attitude confirmed by several of the social
assistants we interviewed. As Ali, the young man who interrupted his university
education, put it:
When you start to look for a job of course you will find one. But you’re not the president
to walk into a high place. You can start from a restaurant, you can start from
a supermarket. Of course, if you are a man you can find a job. You can clean bathroom
in the train stations. You saw that Turkish man that was cleaning the train station? They
clean it every day. Are you better than them? You can make it, you can work too.
Mustafa, a forty-year-old single man, told us that:
I know my Dutch, is not bad, but it’s not perfect. I was a bus driver in Syria, but I have to
start a new life here. I won’t have a job like my job in Syria, so I will do everything. Heavy
work is no problem. It’s important that I work.
This desire for any kind of income-generating work, confirms earlier research
demonstrating that most immigrants favour what Kremer (2016, 408) described as
‘earned citizenship’. ‘Work, above all, is seen as a condition for receiving social security
benefit or provisions, because then you have paid tax. You have to “earn” social
citizenship’. This is strongly in line with neoliberal discourses on the virtualization or
moralization of citizenship, in which social rights are made dependent upon perfor-
mances on the labour market (Schinkel and van Houdt 2010; Schinkel 2010). Syrians
have probably at least partly adopted this discourse, reproducing it in their encounters
with any Belgians. In combination with the structural barriers on the labour market, the
urge to become economically independent as quickly as possible, however, led to
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a problem 3–5 years after their arrival. Many had often began working in the lower
strata of the labour market (e.g. in the social economy, or following short-term
technical training) as soon as they could. After a few years, however, these men and
women found themselves stuck in these lower strata with few if any prospects of
climbing higher up the social ladder. This would require further language training so
as to be able to follow more specialised university, college or vocational certificates.
Since by then they had already been in Belgium for several years – years which they
often felt were ‘lost’ – they unsurprisingly became demotivated and disappointed. In
such cases, Syrians’ short-term moral strategies to undo their dependency as soon as
possible, ultimately left them in a lower labour market position.
Strategic responses to socio-legal assistance
These experiences fed into a combination of shame and anger, as Syrians were expect-
ing more personal forms of interaction, in which they felt treated as equals. As a result,
most seemed reluctant to visit assistants and professional organisations (both civil and
state-led) unless they absolutely needed to. A chasm emerged between professional
assistants and Syrians: the former felt that they ought to respond only to questions
explicitly posed by clients, whereas Syrians had soon taught themselves that profes-
sional assistants were salaried bureaucrats that needed to be approached with scepti-
cism. Respondents who had been in Belgium for a longer period (from approximately
6 months onwards) sometimes even overdid the professional, reserved character of their
interaction with assistants. Khaled, the thirty-two year old man who used to own a little
shop, described his relation with his social assistant from the OCMW as “good. Or let
say it’s normal: I have to do this and that, and she asks, I answer, she asks, I answer,
nothing more."
Syrians thus consulted local social services to ask for the social benefits they were
entitled to, yet they refrained from discussing, for instance, psychosocial problems,
housing problems or general legal queries – even though assistants, generally expecting
to ‘help’ clients, were often surprised to learn of these problems only after a few months,
usually by accident. Soraya told us of a girl in her reception centre who suffered several
times from panic attacks and hyperventilation. After she and her family were given
a separate room on the doctor’s advice, her parents refused to bring her to
a psychologist or therapist, arguing that nothing was ‘wrong’ with their daughter.
According to this respondent, the family experienced this professional help as
a humiliating indication that they had failed as parents. Similarly, Hassan was initially
given a place in a collective reception centre, but moved out after only a few hours,
without awaiting a first ‘in-take’ conversation with his social assistant to inform him
about the application procedure and his rights throughout the process. He learned only
afterwards that by permanently leaving the centre on his own accord, he had lost all
rights to material or immaterial support for as long as his application was pending. On
arrival in Belgium, he did not distinguish between the different government agencies
(e.g. those that were assisting and supporting them, like Fedasil; and those with
a policing, disciplinary function, such as the Immigration Office). It seems likely that
most Syrians continued to follow a principle that makes sense in a land ruled by
a dictatorial regime: only trust those you know personally.
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To circumvent their dependency on professional assistants, Syrian refugees engaged
in two types of strategies: developing trust relations with others, and engaging in
(informal) volunteering work. First, some respondents tried to overcome these
unworthy dependencies on professionals by developing informal rapports. Especially
the most socially and linguistically skilled of the respondents succeeded in building
trust relations with others, largely by convincing others of their trustworthiness.
Crucially they were developing reciprocal bonds in which, over time, they were more
equal than in client-assistant relationships.
Some respondents, for instance, claimed to be able to convince potential landlords by
meeting them in person. Against the background of a very small low-budget rental
market, a shortage of social housing, and a certain degree of ethnic prejudice, they
relied upon individual social skills to convince potential landlords that they were
‘genuine’ persons unlike the foreigners landlords seemed to fear. Ghayath, a young
men who used to work in IT services, told us that:
I got lucky, and the third one (I contacted) was a nice guy. I think he liked me, and I liked
him, so he give me the apartment. First he was saying no, but when I spoke with him, and
I went to drink a coffee with him, he said okay. He said you’re a nice guy, with your wife
and your daughter. And I think maybe it was also because my wife did not wear a hijab,
I think.
In a variant on the same trust-building strategy, Syrians relied less on individual
capacities, and more on membership of a collective entity such as families, ethnicity or
region – a particular form of social capital (Vandevoordt & Verschraegen, forthcoming;
Ryan 2011; Williams 2006). Some respondents were able to borrow money from
friends, neighbours or colleagues of distant family members. What seemed crucial
here, was that the honour of the family would ensure that those lending money or
doing someone a favour would be repaid some time in the future. It would therefore
not be ‘individuals but collectivities that impose[d] obligations of exchange and con-
tract upon each other’ (Mauss [1950] 2002, 6).
Besides developing necessary social ties to solve their problems, our Syrian respon-
dents also relied upon a second strategy to repair the injuries inflected by their
dependency: helping others needier than themselves. They did so by either volunteering
in a professional Belgian organisation, or by providing informal help and advice to
other (Syrian) refugees or homeless persons. While most respondents had not system-
atically been involved in such help in their lives before, it now seemed a very logical way
of proceeding. Several respondents commented upon their volunteering work as doing
something for someone else. Youssef, a twenty-two-year-old single man who interrupted
his university education, told us:
I’m just used to be active all the time, yeah there is no, official work yet so, I’m still young,
so I can do something. I also get a living allowance from the OCMW, which is for nothing.
So it’s a very good idea to help people. We get money from the government, so yeah, we
have to, do a part, for someone else.
Again, such reactions can be considered to fulfil a double moral-social function.
Firstly, they restored respondents’ self-esteem and self-worth by making them feel
worthy of receiving assistance (and benefits, as we will see), as they are giving some-
thing back. Helping others returns them to normal social intercourse, thereby denying
12 R. VANDEVOORDT AND G. VERSCHRAEGEN
or subverting their position of mere dependency on state institutions. One person, for
instance, who was assigned to a reception centre, soon left and went to stay with his
brother who had migrated to Belgium before. Crucially, however, he continued to
volunteer each week in the reception centre – while his own case was being processed,
he was helping out others in a similar socio-legal position. By doing so, he reversed the
social role of mere recipient imposed upon him by the provision of assistance, shelter
and food (Vandevoordt 2017).
Secondly, helping others allowed these Syrian men and women to acquire a better,
less subordinate social position, i.e. to acquire a certain degree of power over others,
precisely by taking responsibility towards them (Bauman 1991). For at least some
respondents, helping others was not so much a value in itself, but rather about making
themselves less dependent and stronger vis-à-vis others. Ahmad, for instance, told us
jokingly of his attempt to reverse roles with his social assistant, as he met her in an
expected context:
And accidently on New Year’s Eve I meet with her. It was something nice, I meet my
assistant who is searching for job to me and, I was at that time, have some joke with her.
I told her okay, you are helping me to find job, and you give me hard job. Okay, today
I am here the boss, and you have to work under me, do that and do that and do that
(laughs). So it was a little bit funny, so I give her little bit orders (laughs), and I told her
after that I give you evaluation, so (laughs).
Conclusion and discussion
We have argued that refugees’ moral experiences are crucial to understanding how
they make sense of and act upon the differential citizenship statuses on offer in the
Belgian welfare state. More concretely, we have argued that the practical realisation of
the rights granted to Syrian refugees was experienced less as a series of rights
evidencing a form of solidarity, but rather as a demeaning state of dependency.
Although these experiences of dependency occurred across variations in age, legal
status, previous professions, ethnic-religious affiliation and gender, they came to the
fore more strongly under specific conditions, which we can only briefly enumerate
below.5 First, some of the respondents who experienced this unworthiness particularly
intensely, did so during periods of prolonged dependency. Respondents who stayed in
reception centres for long periods (up to 2.5 years) whilst waiting for a decision upon
their application seemed to assess their dependency particularly negatively compared
to those who were on a ‘track’ towards a more clearly delineated future (e.g. by
following a language course shortly after arrival, when recognition rates for Syrian
asylum seekers were high).
Second, for some respondents, the experience of unworthy dependency was intensi-
fied by an inability to support their nuclear or extended family members, either by
bringing them to a safe place in Europe, or by providing them with remittances. This
seemed to be particularly the case with single young men and women whose families
were still residing in Syria or its neighbouring countries. In contrast, for older respon-
dents who had been able to bring their nuclear family to Belgium through family
reunification, dependency affected their sense of well-being far less, as it had not
stopped them from fulfilling a basic responsibility towards their families.
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Third, individuals with weaker (informal) social networks were more dependent
upon their professional assistants, which increased their frustrations with these assis-
tants – in some cases, this increased objective dependency paradoxically led respon-
dents to rely more intensely on avoidance strategies. Experiences of unworthy
dependency emerged particularly strongly with individuals who had few, if any, sus-
tainable, closer social contacts. Some individuals were able to counter this situation over
time, using the informal contacts they had more effectively. Paradoxically, these indi-
viduals also seemed much more at ease with receiving help from professional assistants.
Their Belgian contacts would allow them to ask and probe every now and then for
questions regarding their rights, administrative affairs and socio-cultural life in general.
As a result, these stronger informal ties helped to reduce the chasm between Syrians
and professional assistants.
Fourth, in some cases negative experiences of dependency seemed caused by assis-
tants’ attitudes. This was especially apparent for refugees living outside the collective
reception centres housing most asylum seekers awaiting a final decision. These were
mostly reliant on local social services, providing social assistance and benefits to those
in need. These services operate under the municipality’s politically elected representa-
tives, whilst the discretionary nature of their street-level work means considerable
variety in treatment and approach across municipalities (Lipsky 1980) – further exa-
cerbated in the Belgian case because of municipalities’ considerable political autonomy.
Most importantly for understanding experiences of Syrian refugees, these services fulfil
a double function: providing elementary assistance on the one hand, whilst controlling
or disciplining individuals receiving social benefits on the other (e.g. by making sure
they search for jobs, or do not have informal material resources). Hence the particular
role conceptions of these social assistants influenced some Syrians’ experiences of
unworthy, stigmatic dependency. Due to the discretionary liberties inherent to street-
level assistants’ work (Lipsky 1980), some acted more as bureaucratic, controlling and
disciplinary agents than others, which at times clashed with some Syrians’ apparent
expectations of informal, reciprocal solidarity.
As negative experiences of dependency emerged more forcefully with individuals
under these four external conditions, we expect the same structural conditions to have
a similar impact on respondents of other groups (i.e. not Syrian refugees but other
groups of refugees, migrants or Belgians). This seems to resonate with other studies on
welfare stigma more generally, across different national contexts. Nevertheless, we do
think that there are at least two ways in which specific features of our case of Syrian
refugees has fed into our findings.
First, Syrian refugees emigrated from a relatively affluent country with a well-
functioning educational system. All respondents had acquired education until the age
of 16 at the very least. Drawing on our secondary interviews with street-level workers,
volunteers and activists (Vandevoordt 2016) and survey data in Germany (IAB (Institut
für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung) 2016) this relatively high level of education was
the rule, rather than the exception for Syrian refugees. An important consequence
hereof is that Syrian refugees, after arrival in Belgium, experienced considerable degra-
dation of socio-economic status (Vandevoordt and Verschraegen forthcoming).
Second, we think Syrian refugees were in a specific position of semizenship. Other
researchers exploring ‘bottom-up’ perspectives on citizenship have sometimes concentrated
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on immigrants that were preparing to take ‘citizenship tests’ (e.g. Monforte et al 2018).
While our respondents were equally temporary and partial, they seemed more preoccupied
with practical, quick independence from government-organised solidarity, rather than on
acquiring full citizenship by demonstrating cultural assimilation and economic success. If
they had been preparing themselves for citizenship tests, it would indeed make more sense
to interpret their accounts as reproducing the demands imposed by the state. Our respon-
dents, however, seemed to act primarily against a prolonged position of dependency that
was created through practical obstructions to access the labour market, find housing and
establish a social network. From that perspective, the support provided by social benefits
and social assistants appeared as a gift that could not be reciprocated.
Notes
1. This has been researched more elaborately in the US context (Cebulko 2014; De Genova
2002; Menjivar 2006; Mountz et al. 2002), although see Bloch (2002, 2014) and Bloch and
McKay (2016) for examples in the UK context.
2. They were recruited through three channels: NGOs that were contacted to cooperate with
the research; a network of Syrian informants who had resided in Belgium for a longer
period of time; and one of the researcher’s social network established by working as
a volunteer in two local NGOs. Their ethnic backgrounds included Arabs, Kurds and
Palestinians born and raised in Syria. Their legal status included: asylum seekers, recog-
nized refugees, resettled refugees, those being granted humanitarian protection, and
individuals who followed their partners through family reunification. All had claimed
asylum in Belgium after January 2011. Their religious backgrounds included Christians,
Sunni Muslims, Shi’a Muslim and Druzes. Their professions included university-educated
white-collar workers, housewives, teachers, cooks, manual labourers, lorry drivers, farmers
and cooks, although a disproportionately large group consisted of small shop owners and
merchants. Most respondents were men (30 out of 39).
3. While we possibly over-represent respondents who formulated their opinions in particu-
larly pointed or well-articulated ways, both codes emerged across the entire spectrum of
class, ethnic and demographic variables. The negative attitudes towards receiving benefits,
however, was almost exclusively limited to male respondents. This is probably because
providing an income was associated with masculine responsibility to take care of one’s
family (see Vandevoordt and Verschraegen forthcoming).
4. Six out of 39 Syrians used this analogy in one way or another to criticise individual
depending on the state for too long.
5. For a fuller description, see Vandevoordt (2016).
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